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Abstract Housing foreclosures likely have little neighborhood impact if
there are few foreclosures in a neighborhood and the foreclosed
housing can resell quickly. However, when there are many
foreclosures along with a sluggish housing market, foreclosures
can lead to neighborhood destabilization, which should cause
house prices to further fall. This paper measures the impact of
foreclosures on housing sales using a unique dataset from St.
Louis County, Missouri. Results show an expected decline in the
sales price of neighboring sales but the marginal impact of
foreclosures seems to decline with an increase in the number
of foreclosures. These results are robust to a variety of
neighborhood control variables and spatial econometric
techniques.
A rising tide of residential foreclosures has pushed the issue on the political
agenda of leaders at every level of American government. Nationally, the number
of homes in foreclosure in 2007 was 79% higher than the previous year (Veiga,
2008); experts forecast a continuing increase in foreclosures under a perfect storm
of subprime lending, interest rate resets, and declining or stagnant home prices
(Edmiston and Zalneraitis, 2007). In St. Louis County, Missouri, the focus of this
study, recorded foreclosure deeds increased 46% in the same period. These trends
have renewed fears that foreclosures could further weaken local housing markets
and some local leaders have argued for an aggressive federal response (U.S.
Conference of Mayors, 2007).
In doing so, advocates of policy action point to how foreclosures are adversely
affecting local housing markets, increasing the number of houses on the market
and corresponding vacancies as housing inventories increase. Scholars have also
detailed the costs to local governments as they respond to housing vacancy issues,
with estimates ranging from $27,000 to $30,000 for each foreclosure (Moreno,
1995; Apgar and Duda, 2005). More broadly, however, scholars have used
econometric models to quantify the impact of foreclosures upon local sales prices.
Among the most fruitful of recent research uses data on foreclosures in the city
of Chicago in 1997 and 1998 to explore their impact on single-family property
sales in 2000 (Immergluck and Smith, 2006a). The authors found that foreclosures456  Rogers and Winter
had a statistically signiﬁcant impact on property values within an eighth of mile
of the foreclosed property, a 0.9% decline for each foreclosure. Similar results
were replicated using a national pool of both foreclosed and non-foreclosed
properties (Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao, 2009). The study found that foreclosures
have a signiﬁcant negative impact of up to 8.7% on neighborhood property values
up to 10 blocks from the foreclosure and from ﬁve years of the foreclosure.
In their focus on individual single-family property sales as the dependent variable
and inclusion of a range of housing and locational characteristics as predictors,
these more recent analyses have signiﬁcantly improved the modeling of
foreclosure impacts and generally resulted in more precise estimates of impact. In
doing so, they link to a broader literature in the ﬁeld of urban econometrics that
has explored the impact of various types of housing investments on residential
property prices. For example, scholars have found strong evidence that investments
in new housing positively impact sales values (Simons, Quercia, and Maric, 1998;
Lee, Culhane, and Wachter, 1999; Ding, Simons, and Baku, 2000; Ellen, Schill,
Susin, and Schwartz, 2001; Ding and Knapp, 2003); additionally, some studies
have shown a similar impact with the rehabilitation of existing housing (Lee,
Culhane, and Wachter, 1999; Ding, Simons, and Baku, 2000), with some variation
based on the type and scale of the project.
At the same time, problems remain with the current research agenda, particularly
with model speciﬁcation. Most signiﬁcant is the use of the relatively limited
dataset of both foreclosures and sales—restricted to just two years in the former
case and one year in the latter for Immergluck and Smith (2006a). Because of
this fact, the authors restrict their temporal and geographic modeling to just two
years and two predetermined distance dimensions. Secondly, Immergluck and
Smith’s use of the median block group of self-reported single-family house values
from the 2000 Census—in effect, a 1999 measurement—introduces some
endogeneity problems.
This paper adds to the literature by estimating the foreclosure effect but allowing
the foreclosure effect to change over time and space, thus allowing for a more
ﬂexible estimate. In contrast to past estimates, this analysis utilizes a dataset of
foreclosures from 1998 through 2007 and sales from a similar time period. Also,
unobserved neighborhood characteristics are controlled for in a manner more
consistent with the spatial econometric literature. Results show an expected
decline in the sales price of neighboring sales but the effect is quite local in both
temporal and spatial dimensions. Furthermore, and unexpectedly, the foreclosure
impact shows no point in the number of foreclosures where neighborhood sales
decline rapidly. By contrast, while the impact of foreclosures is both statistically
signiﬁcant and, aggregated across communities, signiﬁcant in real terms, the
marginal impact of foreclosures seems to decline as foreclosures increase. These
results are robust to a variety of neighborhood control variables and spatial
econometric techniques; although though we were unable to control for the quality
of foreclosure events (i.e., the foreclosed property’s physical condition or vacancy
status).The Impact of Foreclosures  457
JRER  Vol. 31  N o . 4–2 0 0 9
 Method
Foreclosure is ﬁrst and foremost a characteristic describing the seller of the
property not necessarily the condition of the property. Therefore, when one speaks
of a foreclosure as being a distressed property, it is really the distress of the seller
that is being described not necessarily the property. The negative correlation
between foreclosure locations may exist because foreclosed properties tend to
produce negative spillover effects including vacancies, reduced maintenance of the
foreclosure property (Harding, Miceli, and Sirmans, 2000), and possibly increased
crime (Immergluck and Smith, 2000b).1
A hedonic model was chosen to estimate the effect of foreclosures on neighboring
housing prices. The model’s dependent variable was the natural log of sales price
followed by two variables sets:
lnP  A  B  , (1a)
where the ﬁrst term included yearly dummies denoting the time of sale, the house
structural characteristics, and spatial characteristics. The second term included
foreclosure variables that were meant to account for the potential marginal impact
of neighboring foreclosure by counting the number of foreclosures within a spatio-
temporal ring:
 B , (1b) t,s t,s
where t and s denote the linear temporal and spatial distance from each sale
respectively. Speciﬁcation 1b allows the marginal price impact of foreclosures to
vary such that foreclosures closer in time and space were allowed to have a
different impact than foreclosures farther away. Temporal distance was measured
in months between foreclosure and sale, and spatial distance was measured by
Euclidean calculation in yards between foreclosure and sale. Each ring maintained
mutually exclusivity, for example, B6,100 counts foreclosures within six months
before the sale and within 100 yards of the sale, and B12,200 counts foreclosures
between six and 12 months before the sale and between 100 and 200 yards of the
sale.
Equation 1a was extended by allowing for non-linear effects in quadratic form:
2  B   B . (1c) t,s t,s t,s t,s458  Rogers and Winter
This speciﬁcation allows the marginal price impact to vary by the number of
existing foreclosures in the area. It was expected that neighborhoods with few
foreclosures will have a small marginal impact but as foreclosures begin to
accumulate, the marginal impact of foreclosure will rise as residents become
concerned about rapid neighborhood decline. Thus, we expected all beta
coefﬁcients in Equation 1c to be negative.
Spatial Dependence
The hedonic model received an adjustment to account for spatial autocorrelation
due to spatial heterogeneity. Spatial autocorrelation exists whenever the errors are
correlated across space (Anselin, 1988), which is likely with housing data but is
especially important given the potential for a missing neighborhood variable bias.
Spatial autocorrelation may be a particularly corrosive error when measuring the
impact of foreclosures because foreclosures tend to be spatially clustered. We
employed an adjustment to our model following Anselin (1988) and Kelejian and
Prucha (1999), where the error term becomes:
*  W  u, (2)
where W is the predetermined spatial weight representing the spatial relationship
between residuals,  is a coefﬁcient to be estimated that acts as a scalar
‘‘weighting’’ the spatial structure, and a small  (close to zero) signiﬁes as weak
spatial relationship. Because the spatial weight W is not estimated but chosen,
consequently there is an unlimited variety of spatial weights that could be
constructed. Choosing a proper spatial weight is akin to choosing an econometric
functional form: the researcher must use economic theory, formal tests, and expert
experience. Currently, it is common practice among real estate researchers to use
a nearest-neighbor weighting structure, where each k nearest neighboring sales,
not including the sale in question, are assigned a one in the matrix and all other
sales are assigned a zero. Sales dates are not considered in the construction of
our W, and thus k observed OLS errors of past and/or future sales are included
for each observation. As a consequence, this spatial correction controls for
temporally ﬁxed but spatially variable unobserved characteristics of the housing
market.
A nearest-neighbor spatial weight was chosen using the 10 nearest neighbors.2
Given the large sample size and the asymmetric spatial weight, a maximum
likelihood procedure could not be used (Anselin, 1988), so a method of moments
estimator (GMM) was employed following Kelejian and Prucha (1999) and Bell
and Bockstael (2000).The Impact of Foreclosures  459
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Causation and Biased Selection
An additional methodological issue relating to the analysis of foreclosures is the
issue of causation. The hedonic model proposed above implies that the foreclosure
effect is exogenous. However, there exists a large literature that identiﬁes the
causes of foreclosures including the loan-to-value ratio (LTV).3 Lower prices also
will increase the chances of future foreclosures, so the process is to some degree
endogenous, with foreclosures potentially causing lower neighborhood prices and
then lower neighborhood prices causing more foreclosures. While falling prices,
which will increase the LTV, increase the probability of default, there are a variety
of other factors that impact foreclosure including unemployment and divorce
(Capozza, Kazarian, and Thomson, 1997).
Separating out these two different effects can be accomplished using an
instrumental variables approach. The difﬁculty is in ﬁnding an instrument or
instrument set that is correlated with the foreclosure but not correlated with the
errors of the hedonic model. We found no such instrument, and it is unlikely that
without detailed household information any instrument exists. Consequently,
claims of causation must be made cautiously.
Another methodological issue related to foreclosure spillover effects is the
problem of a biased sample. In one sense, sample selection bias cannot be a
concern because we are estimating a model using the full population of arms-
length sales. However, as foreclosed housing builds up in a neighborhood, home
sellers may delay the sale of their house in order to avoid a loss. If the loss-
avoidance choice is not distributed randomly within the neighborhood, then the
above estimator may be biased.
Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009) used a simple two-step procedure, developed by
Heckman (1979),4 to test and correct for sample bias. The authors used nine
exclusion variables describing the characteristics of the loan and ﬁnancial situation
of the borrower. They ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant bias but the effects on the
hedonic model are quite small, which suggests no economically signiﬁcant bias.
Still, Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2003) argue that due to the uniqueness of
the housing market, some characteristics of the buyers and sellers are observed in
the unit sales price; which suggests that some of the sample selection variables
used by Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao may also be house price predictors.
 Data
St. Louis County, the study area for this analysis, is an older urban county located
on the eastern side of the state in the St. Louis Metropolitan Statistical Area.
While the county has seen a large increase in foreclosures since 1998, comparative
data suggests that the area’s foreclosure problem is not attributable to the housing
bubble impacts that have preceded an increase in foreclosures in other parts of460  Rogers and Winter
the country. The 2007 foreclosure rate for the county is slightly lower than that
for the nation as a whole (RealyTrac, 2008). Housing prices in the county
increased 75% since the ﬁrst quarter of 1998, as compared to 87% for the nation,
and, in 2008, standardized prices for the county were only half of that of the
nation (Ofﬁce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, 2008). The county’s
relatively low performing housing market is related to the state of the local
economy. St. Louis County’s 2007 unemployment rate was 50% higher than that
of the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). From 1998 through 2006, the
county lost 2% of its total jobs, compared to 11% increase for the nation as a
whole (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006).
Data describing single-family housing sales and foreclosures were collected from
the St. Louis County Recorder of Deeds and the St. Louis County Assessor. The
dataset includes 98,828 single-family sales considered arms-length by the
Assessor’s Ofﬁce5 for the years 2000 through 2007, and 23,334 single-family
housing foreclosures and liquidations for the years 1998 through 2007. All sales
and foreclosure data originates from deeds, not mortgage information; thus, all
foreclosures events are ﬁnal in the sense that the situation has moved beyond
default, and a bank, trustee or new owner has taken over ownership of the property.
Exhibit 1 presents the total foreclosures of single-family housing in St. Louis
County and the single-family housing foreclosure rate. The foreclosures include
all foreclosures and liquidations of single-family housing as identiﬁed by the St.
Louis County Assessor’s ofﬁce. The foreclosure rate is a count of single-family
housing foreclosures divided by the total number of single-family housing units
in the county; thus our calculation is not a default rate. By contrast, most private
real estate ﬁrms use total mortgages or households in the denominator, a statistic
unavailable at the county level. The exhibit shows that the count of foreclosure
has increased 260% since 2000, with the foreclosure rate nearly tripling since
2003. As shown in Exhibit 2, while foreclosures have been seen in all parts of
St. Louis County, there are high clusters of them in the mid-north county area.
Since foreclosures are expected to have weaker effects at greater spatial and
temporal distances, several spatial-temporal concentric rings were calculated to
count foreclosures at various bands. For each house sale, 12 concentric rings (four
100 yard by three 6 month) were calculated, and foreclosures within each ring
were counted. Therefore, each ring represents foreclosures farther in time and
space from the observed sale. Means for all foreclosure rings are presented in
Exhibit 3. The exhibit shows that mean foreclosure counts more or less uniformly
increase in both space and time around sales; alternatively, there is a more
pronounced clustering of foreclosures in spatial terms within the ﬁrst 100-yard
band, with more uniform decreases in temporal terms past the ﬁrst six months.
Exhibit 4 reports the mean and standard deviation of dependent and control
variables. Control variables were chosen based on what we believe to be important
factors in the St. Louis housing market. We found our foreclosure results to be
















































Exhibit 1  St. Louis County Single-Family Foreclosure Counts and as a Percentage of Single-Family Housing Stock
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Foreclosures 751 1,231 1,693 1,469 1,459 1,979 2,407 2,249 3,840 6,256
Foreclosure Rate na na 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 1.4% 2.2%
Notes: Foreclosures include all foreclosures and liquidations of single-family housing as identiﬁed by the St. Louis County Assessor’s ofﬁce. The foreclosure
rate is a count of single-family housing foreclosures divided by the total number of single-family housing units in the county; thus our calculation isn o ta
default rate. Most private real estate ﬁrms use total mortgages or households in the denominator.462  Rogers and Winter
Exhibit 2  Density of Foreclosures in St. Louis County: 1998–2007
Exhibit 3  Mean Foreclosure Count by Spatial-Temporal Ring
Foreclosure Months from Sale
Yards from Sale 6 12 18 24
100 0.0821 0.0706 0.0584 0.0530
200 0.1784 0.1595 0.1429 0.1319
300 0.2726 0.2378 0.2153 0.1966
400 0.3462 0.3069 0.2752 0.2520
500 0.4173 0.3640 0.3303 0.3016
600 0.4917 0.4283 0.3851 0.3498
Note: Means are calculated from the 98,828 single-family sales. Foreclosure density is the number
of foreclosures per single-family housing unit in the same ring.The Impact of Foreclosures  463
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Exhibit 4  Variables, Notes, and Basic Statistics
Variable Description Type Mean Std. Dev.
Real Price Real price in 2007 dollars (CPI
Urban)
Continuous 204,800 170,330
Age In years from sale Discrete 38.7 21.7
Area In acres Continuous 0.274 0.381
Living Area In square feet Discrete 1,641.8 814.6
Stories Discrete 1.261 0.440
Bedrooms Discrete 3.074 0.797
Bathrooms Discrete 1.691 0.701
HalfBath Discrete 0.441 0.551
AC Air conditioning Dichotomous 0.945 0.228
Chimney Discrete 0.348 0.534
Pools Private lot pools Discrete 0.043 0.211
Tennis Private lot tennis courts Discrete 0.001 0.027
ArtRoad In miles from center of property to
nearest arterial road
Continuous 0.224 0.229
Ramp In miles from center of property to
nearest interstate onramp
Continuous 1.545 1.210
Metro In miles from center of property to
nearest light-rail station
Continuous 7.190 4.696
FEMA 100 In 100 year ﬂood zone Dichotomous 0.016 0.125
 Hedonic Results
Regression results for all three models are presented in Exhibits 5 through 7,
where each model includes two estimations: (1) OLS with foreclosure counts; (2)
spatial GMM with foreclosure counts. Each exhibit reports the coefﬁcients on the
foreclosure variables,  when applicable, and selected diagnostics and control
variable coefﬁcients are summarized in the Appendix. The foreclosure variables
are labeled by distance and time (i.e., y200m06 counts all foreclosures within 200
yards and 6 months since the observed sale). Exhibit 5 includes the quadratic and
Exhibit 6 includes interaction terms respectively so the quadratic and interaction
coefﬁcients are reported in the same row as the unadjusted variable.
All models tested signiﬁcant for heteroscedasticity using a Breusch-Pagan test;
thus all t-scores were adjusted for heteroscedasticity using a HC3 type correction.6
All models also tested signiﬁcant for spatial dependence using the Lagrangian
Multiplier (LM) test, where the robust LM tests favor the spatial error estimator



















Exhibit 5  Marginal Neighborhood Effect of Foreclosures on Housing Prices (Models 5 and 6)
Model 5 Model 6
Variable t,s t,s
2 Bt,s t,s t,s
2 Bt,s t,s*D0305 t,s *D0305
2 Bt,s t,s*D0607 t,s *D0305
2 Bt,s
y200m06 0.0192 0.0021 0.0335 0.0051 0.0121 0.0028 0.0244 0.0045
(7.45)* (2.94)* (7.58)* (3.64)* (1.95) (1.37) (4.23)* (2.77)*
y200m12 0.0177 0.0034 0.0294 0.0063 0.0139 0.0035 0.0168 0.0037
(8.08)* (5.62)* (7.01)* (5.30)* (2.56)* (2.31)* (3.06)* (2.55)*
y200m18 0.0177 0.0032 0.0156 0.0014 0.0072 0.0032 0.0031 0.0021
(7.25)* (4.41)* (3.76)* (1.11) (1.29) (1.95) (0.50) (1.11)
y200m24 0.0206 0.0020 0.0189 0.0008 0.0055 0.0028 0.0025 0.0005
(8.10)* (2.60)* (4.27)* (0.58) (0.92) (1.48) (0.39) (0.27)
y400m06 0.0110 0.0009 0.0219 0.0024 0.0094 0.0011 0.0136 0.0020
(8.58)* (4.85)* (8.53)* (4.85)* (2.97)* (2.05)* (4.25)* (3.78)*
y400m12 0.0115 0.0011 0.0172 0.0021 0.0019 0.0016 0.0138 0.0016
(6.87)* (4.15)* (8.76)* (8.00)* (0.91) (4.40)* (4.81)* (2.42)*
y400m18 0.0129 0.0012 0.0167 0.0019 0.0051 0.0006 0.0048 0.0013
(7.06)* (3.52)* (6.55)* (4.17)* (1.50) (1.10) (1.23) (1.93)
y400m24 0.0159 0.0014 0.0164 0.0010 0.0007 0.0005 0.0023 0.0001
















































Exhibit 5  (continued)
Marginal Neighborhood Effect of Foreclosures on Housing Prices (Models 5 and 6)
Model 5 Model 6
Variable t,s t,s
2 Bt,s t,s t,s
2 Bt,s t,s*D0305 t,s *D0305
2 Bt,s t,s*D0607 t,s *D0305
2 Bt,s
y600m06 0.0050 0.0001 0.0217 0.0018 0.0126 0.0012 0.0203 0.0018
(1.51) (0.17) (11.80)* (7.35)* (5.03)* (3.70)* (7.79)* (6.32)*
y600m12 0.0073 0.0004 0.0157 0.0016 0.0043 0.0008 0.0144 0.0016
(4.03)* (1.64) (7.55)* (5.17)* (1.63) (2.11)* (5.14)* (4.43)*
y600m18 0.0116 0.0011 0.0156 0.0017 0.0079 0.0009 0.0039 0.0010
(8.66)* (5.81)* (7.82)* (5.75)* (2.92)* (2.41)* (1.37) (2.78)*
y600m24 0.0155 0.0012 0.0157 0.0012 0.0023 0.0002 0.0012 0.0002
(12.23)* (7.19)* (7.03)* (3.30)* (0.82) (0.49) (0.37) (0.42)
R2 0.907 0.908
Notes: This table provides OLS estimates of Models 5 and 6. For Model 5, k  127; for Model 6, k  174. Coefﬁcients on the interaction terms are
reported in the adjacent columns. The heteroscedasticity robust z-statistics are in parentheses. N  98,828.



















Exhibit 6  Marginal Neighborhood Effect of Foreclosures on Housing Prices (Models 7 and 8)
Model 7 Model 8
Variable t,s t,s
2 Bt,s t,s t,s
2 Bt,s t,s*D0305 t,s *D0305
2 Bt,s t,s*D0607 t,s *D0305
2 Bt,s
y200m06 0.0070 0.0004 0.0139 0.0023 0.0018 0.0017 0.0144 0.0029
(4.98)* (1.22) (4.55)* (2.54)* (0.46) (1.53) (3.73)* (2.99)*
y200m12 0.0062 0.0016 0.0172 0.0043 0.0153 0.0043 0.0137 0.0031
(3.87)* (3.91)* (5.92)* (5.61)* (3.88)* (4.10)* (3.36)* (3.11)*
y200m18 0.0059 0.0015 0.0059 0.0007 0.0036 0.0013 0.0029 0.0013
(3.27)* (3.04)* (1.93) (0.81) (0.87) (1.12) (0.64) (1.02)
y200m24 0.0035 0.0004 0.0027 0.0006 0.0035 0.0014 0.0017 0.0008
(1.92) (0.72) (0.84) (0.69) (0.81) (1.15) (0.37) (0.59)
y400m06 0.0036 0.0001 0.0091 0.0009 0.0027 0.0005 0.0074 0.0011
(4.12)* (1.08) (5.02)* (2.90)* (1.17) (1.36) (3.18)* (3.25)*
y400m12 0.0048 0.0006 0.0067 0.0011 0.0028 0.0007 0.0048 0.0007
(5.16)* (5.00)* (4.80)* (5.74)* (2.02)* (2.97)* (2.25)* (2.01)*
y400m18 0.0047 0.0003 0.0085 0.0010 0.0053 0.0008 0.0028 0.0007
(4.47)* (2.09)* (4.67)* (3.24)* (2.15)* (2.04)* (1.07) (1.72)
y400m24 0.0159 0.0014 0.0164 0.0010 0.0007 0.0005 0.0023 0.0001
















































Exhibit 6  (continued)
Marginal Neighborhood Effect of Foreclosures on Housing Prices (Models 7 and 8)
Model 7 Model 8
Variable t,s t,s
2 Bt,s t,s t,s
2 Bt,s t,s*D0305 t,s *D0305
2 Bt,s t,s*D0607 t,s *D0305
2 Bt,s
y600m06 0.0050 0.0001 0.0217 0.0018 0.0126 0.0012 0.0203 0.0018
(1.51) (0.17) (11.80)* (7.35)* (5.03)* (3.70)* (7.79)* (6.32)*
y600m12 0.0073 0.0004 0.0157 0.0016 0.0043 0.0008 0.0144 0.0016
(4.03)* (1.64) (7.55)* (5.17)* (1.63) (2.11)* (5.14)* (4.43)*
y600m18 0.0116 0.0011 0.0156 0.0017 0.0079 0.0009 0.0039 0.0010
(8.66)* (5.81)* (7.82)* (5.75)* (2.92)* (2.41)* (1.37) (2.78)*
y600m24 0.0155 0.0012 0.0157 0.0012 0.0023 0.0002 0.0012 0.0002
(12.23)* (7.19)* (7.03)* (3.30)* (0.82) (0.49) (0.37) (0.42)
 0.6573 0.6522
R2 0.939 0.939
Notes: This table provides GMM estimates of Models 7 and 9. The GMM procedure was used to control for spatial autocorrelation with autocorrelation
parameter  and 10 nearest-neighbors spatial weight (Kelejian and Prucha, 1999). Coefﬁcients on the interaction terms are reported in the adjacent
columns. For Model 7, k  128; for Model 9, k  173. N  98,828.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.468  Rogers and Winter
Exhibit 7  Comparison of Implied Marginal Neighboring Foreclosure Impact on Sales Price (OLS)




Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao
(2009)
100 & 200 Meters 5.0%, 4.8% 8.7%, 4.7%
Rogers and Winter 200 Yards 1.4% 1.4% 0.6%
Notes: Table presents the implied price impacts of a neighboring foreclosure within the reported
distance and two years time. For comparison purposes, only the OLS models are reported. Lin,
Rosenblatt, and Yao’s (2009) results are reported based on visual inspection of their Figure 8.
parameter in time series, includes the weighted average of neighboring sales prices
as an alternative to the spatial error model. The spatial lag estimator was still run
for all models using spatial two-stage least squares (Anselin, 1988), but the results
were quite similar to OLS and thus were not reported.
As expected, all estimations of all models report economically and statically
signiﬁcant negative neighborhood impacts of single-family foreclosures on single-
family sale prices. The Appendix summarizes the model control variables. Beyond
the expected negative impacts, we believe there are three points worth
highlighting. First, the marginal neighborhood foreclosure impact is about 1% or
less, depending on the spatial-temporal distance and estimator used. Our results
are similar to Immergluck and Smith (2006a) but far less than Lin, Rosenblatt,
and Yao’s (2009) results. Second, again in contrast to Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao,
the marginal neighborhood foreclosure impact is the greatest in the relatively
stable years of 2000 through 2002. Finally, our quadratic model demonstrates that
the marginal neighborhood foreclosure impact is non-linear.
Marginal Neighborhood Foreclosure Impact
Model 1 in Exhibit 8 reports the marginal foreclosure impact on neighboring sales
prices. All coefﬁcients are negative and signiﬁcant. Furthermore, as expected, for
any given time frame (m), foreclosures have a larger negative impact when closer:
the coefﬁcients on the 200 yard rings are more negative than their corresponding
coefﬁcients on the 400 and 600 yard rings.
Our OLS estimates in Model 1 are quite similar to Immergluck and Smith’s
(2006a,b). Immergluck and Smith used one year of Chicago sales data (1999) and
two years of foreclosure counts7 (1997, 1998) to estimate the foreclosure impact
using independent spatial rings of 1/8 mile and 1/4 mile, which would be
















































Exhibit 8  Marginal Neighborhood Effect of Foreclosures on Housing Prices (Models 1–4)
OLS GMM
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable t,s t,s t,s*D0305 t,s*D0607 t,s t,s t,s*D0305 t,s*D0607
y200m06 0.0114 0.0196 0.0040 0.0137 0.0055 0.0078 0.0026 0.0053
(8.75)* (7.90)* (1.23) (4.24)* (6.28)* (4.80)* (1.23) (2.44)*
y200m12 0.0061 0.0091 0.0022 0.0073 0.0007 0.0034 0.0018 0.0051
(4.35)* (3.51)* (0.66) (2.01)* (0.71) (2.13)* (0.84) (2.12)*
y200m18 0.0083 0.0111 0.0025 0.0094 0.0013 0.0036 0.0003 0.0070
(5.56)* (4.22)* (0.72) (2.50)* (1.24) (2.08)* (0.13) (2.70)*
y200m24 0.0144 0.0166 0.0044 0.0017 0.0043 0.0044 0.0009 0.0038
(9.20)* (6.06)* (1.21) (0.43) (4.17)* (2.56)* (0.38) (1.45)
y400m06 0.0042 0.0106 0.0054 0.0062 0.0025 0.0051 0.0010 0.0021
(5.40)* (7.06)* (2.80)* (3.12)* (4.54)* (5.07)* (0.76) (1.52)
y400m12 0.0030 0.0057 0.0001 0.0083 0.0006 0.0011 0.0019 0.0021
(3.35)* (3.56)* (0.03) (3.80)* (1.10) (1.05) (1.35) (1.42)
y400m18 0.0060 0.0063 0.0026 0.0006 0.0024 0.0033 0.0016 0.0003
(6.46)* (3.77)* (1.21) (0.24) (3.92)* (3.09)* (1.12) (0.17)
y400m24 0.0080 0.0117 0.0060 0.0028 0.0037 0.0061 0.0035 0.0006



















Exhibit 8  (continued)
Marginal Neighborhood Effect of Foreclosures on Housing Prices (Models 1–4)
OLS GMM
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable t,s t,s t,s*D0305 t,s*D0607 t,s t,s t,s*D0305 t,s*D0607
y600m06 0.0037 0.0101 0.0046 0.0085 0.0014 0.0058 0.0030 0.0057
(6.25)* (8.36)* (2.97)* (5.50)* (3.42)* (7.34)* (2.91)* (5.46)*
y600m12 0.0031 0.0052 0.0002 0.0057 0.0016 0.0025 0.0006 0.0016
(4.41)* (3.96)* (0.14) (3.18)* (3.40)* (2.92)* (0.54) (1.32)
y600m18 0.0047 0.0056 0.0036 0.0006 0.0015 0.0033 0.0034 0.0005
(6.19)* (4.10)* (2.02)* (0.33) (2.89)* (3.81)* (2.96)* (0.40)
y600m24 0.0077 0.0085 0.0029 0.0023 0.0032 0.0047 0.0022 0.0003
(10.25)* (6.32)* (1.63) (1.24) (6.22)* (5.37)* (1.84) (0.25)
 0.6582 0.6580
R2 0.906 0.906 0.939 0.939
Notes: Coefﬁcients on the interaction terms are reported in the adjacent columns. The GMM procedure was used to control for spatial autocorrelation with
autocorrelation parameter  and 10 nearest-neighbors spatial weight (Kelejian and Prucha, 1999). For OLS, the heteroscedasticity robust z-statistics are
in parentheses, GMM estimates report also asymptotic z-statistics. For Model 1, k  115; for Model 2, k  139; for Model 3, k  116; for Model 4,
k  140. N  98,828.
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.The Impact of Foreclosures  471
JRER  Vol. 31  N o . 4–2 0 0 9
and the y600s dropped. Immergluck and Smith found a marginal impact of
0.0114 and 0.0033 for their respective rings; however, when they added the
median block group of self-reported single-family house values from the 2000
Census, the marginal impact fell to 0.0091 for the 1/8 mile ring and insigniﬁcant
for the 1/4 mile ring. For example, assume a foreclosure has happened within the
last six months and 200 yards. Model 1 implies a decline of 1.1% or about $2,200
off the sales price of an otherwise $200,000 unit, while Immergluck and Smith’s
estimates imply the same decline.
By contrast, our Model 1 estimates suggest a much smaller foreclosure impact
compared to Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009). Lin, Rosenblatt and Yao also use
Chicago sales (2006) and foreclosure data (1996 through 2006) and employ a
similar hedonic model. They estimate a marginal foreclosure impact of about 8.7%
for foreclosures within 100 meters and two years and about 4.7% within 200
meters and two years. For the same neighboring $200,000 housing unit as
described above, a single foreclosure would lower the sales value by about $7,400
to $17,400 depending on the exact distance.
The GMM estimates reported as Model 3 in Exhibit 8 suggest that foreclosures
have a smaller impact than the OLS results suggest by about half. All coefﬁcients
are still negative but three are not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, which
suggest that the standard errors in the OLS models are biased downward (Bell
and Bockstael, 2000).
It is not clear why our results are similar to Immergluck and Smith but much
smaller compared to Lin/Rosenblatt/Yao. All three studies employ a similar
hedonic model and report at least one OLS estimation. Immergluck and Smith
and Lin, Rosenblatt and Yao use the Chicago housing market but different periods,
while we use the St. Louis housing market and a period that overlaps both of the
above studies.
Temporal Interactions
Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009) argue that the marginal foreclosure impact should
be larger in ‘‘bad’’ markets therefore they estimate a model using sales data from
2003 and compare the results to the 2006 sample. They ﬁnd a larger marginal
foreclosure impact for foreclosures within two years and 100 meters in 2006 but
a negligible difference among all other foreclosure rings.
Model 2 (OLS) and Model 4 (GMM), in Exhibit 8, test the foreclosure coefﬁcients
for a structural change over two time periods: 2003–2005 and 2006–2007. To
provide a sense of the housing market dynamics in St. Louis County, Exhibit 9
charts the number of foreclosures by quarter and the housing index produced by
Model 1. The foreclosure count was fairly stable from 2000 through 2002. From
2003 through 2005 foreclosures began to rise and in 2006 and 2007 rose
dramatically. Thus, the foreclosure rings were interacted with temporal dummy472  Rogers and Winter







































variables such that the ring coefﬁcients are now t,sBt,s  t,sBt,s*D0305 
t,sBt,s*D0607.
The OLS and GMM results still suggest a negative marginal foreclosure impact
but the marginal impact is smaller in 2006 and 2007. All coefﬁcients in column
t,sBt,s of Model 2 in Exhibit 8 are negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Not
all coefﬁcients in the interaction columns (t,sBt,s*D0305 and t,sBt,s*D0607) are
positive but all the signiﬁcant coefﬁcients are positive, which suggests that the
marginal impact has declined. Furthermore, all signiﬁcant coefﬁcients in column
t,sBt,s*D0607 of Model 2 (7 of 12) nearly offset the coefﬁcients in column t,sBt,s.
Thus, Model 2 suggests that the marginal foreclosure impact from 2000 through
2005 was between about 0.5% and 2% depending on the spatial-temporal distance
but the marginal foreclosure impact from 2006 through 2007 was negligible. This
result is echoed in Model 4, although Model 4 has fewer signiﬁcant coefﬁcients.
Model 2 allows for a complete temporal comparison of our OLS results to
Immergluck and Smith (2006a,b) and Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009). Assuming
a foreclosure has happened within the last six months and 200 yards, Model 2
implies a decline of almost 2% in the years 2000 through 2005 or about $4,000
off the sales price of an otherwise $200,000 unit, while Immergluck and Smith’s
estimates a decline of about $2,200 in the year 2000 (using 2007 prices via the
CPI). Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao’s results imply a decline of about $10,000 in the
year 2003 and about $7,400 to $17,400 in 2006 depending on the exact distance,
while our results imply a decline of about 0.6% or $1,200 in 2006 and 2007.
Quadratic Form
The ﬁnal implication of this study is that foreclosures, at least in the St. Louis
County market, have a diminishing marginal impact within a given time period.The Impact of Foreclosures  473
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To test this, Models 1–4 were re-estimated with a quadratic term to create Models
5–8. The quadratic term allows the marginal foreclosure impact to change based
on the level of foreclosures; thus the quadratic term differentiates the high-
foreclosure neighborhoods from the low-foreclosure neighborhoods.
Exhibit 5 presents the OLS estimates for Models 5 and 6. The quadratic
coefﬁcients in Model 5 imply a diminishing marginal impact of foreclosures. It
should be noted that not all coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level;
of the 12 pairs, 10 are signiﬁcant. This result is somewhat surprising because
it suggests that neighborhoods are self-stabilizing, at least with respect to
foreclosures, which is in contrast to the scenario of neighborhood tipping points.
Model 6, in Exhibit 5, introduce the temporal structural tests. As in Model 5, all
t,ss are negative and all t,s are positive. Roughly half of the temporal 2 B s t,s
interactions are signiﬁcant at the 5% level but those that are tell the same story:
the marginal foreclosure impact is ﬂatter in the later years especially from 2006
through 2007.
Exhibit 6 presents the GMM estimates in Models 7 and 8. Although there are
generally fewer statistically signiﬁcant results, the pattern in the same as in Exhibit
5. Foreclosures in St. Louis County have a negative but diminishing marginal
impact on neighboring house sale prices.
In the context of the literature of foreclosure spillovers, Models 5–8 are unique
and consequently should be tested by an examination of other markets. Obviously,
the ﬁnding could be a result of the subject market, along with a stable but older
urban market and time period and the beginning and initial impact of a national
credit and housing crisis. In other words, because the rise of foreclosures is a
fairly recent phenomenon and one would expect that a full effect would take a
number of years, it may be that this analysis is too early to capture the marginal
effects of foreclosures in St. Louis County. On the other hand, the structural tests
suggest that neighborhood foreclosure impacts are moving in the direction of
insigniﬁcance.
 Conclusion
The conventional view among many policy analysts has been that the rising tide
of foreclosures will cause deep declines in the sales values of neighboring
properties, extending the housing crisis into local ﬁscal policy. This analysis
provides a more robust speciﬁcation of the foreclosure impact than past studies,
including specifying a hedonic price model that corrects for spatial error and
selection bias and has a robust set of neighborhood controls. In doing so, however,
the analysis suggests that the impact may be much smaller and more local than
previously thought in both spatial and temporal terms. Most signiﬁcantly, our
ﬁndings suggest that there does not appear to be a tipping point where at some
threshold the neighborhood sales decline rapidly. In fact, the marginal impact of
foreclosures seems to decline with an increase in the number of foreclosures,474  Rogers and Winter
suggesting that at some point neighborhoods are self-stabilizing; although, we are
unable to control for causality.
Our analysis points out the importance of replicated studies at different time points
and within different markets. Some of the variance in results presented here, as
opposed to past studies of foreclosure effects, could be due to the models
employed or due to the different housing markets at different points in time. For
example, our Model 1 (OLS) results are similar to Immergluck and Smith (2006b):
the marginal foreclosure impact is about 1% of the sales price when the
foreclosure is within 200 yards (roughly 1/8 of a mile). However, our Model 2
(OLS) estimates are far smaller and in contrast to Lin, Rosenblatt and Yao’s (2009)
estimates: we estimate the marginal foreclosure impact to be smaller in bad
markets (2006 and 2007). Exhibit 7 compares our 200 yard OLS results from
Model 2 to Immergluck and Smith and Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao. Since both
previous studies counted all foreclosures within two years, Exhibit 7 reports the
weighted average of all four 200 yard coefﬁcients from Model 2.
The regression results point to a declining marginal neighboring-foreclosure effect
both in cross-section and over time; however, due to data limitations, we were
unable to explore the reasons for the decline. That is, we only measure the quantity
of distressed properties and not other qualitative effects of the foreclosure process.8
This declining impact could be a function of the characteristics of the deed prior
to the default, the characteristics of the property after foreclosure or the changing
characteristics of local actors within submarkets in the region. Full exploration of
a neighborhood foreclosure effect, then, would require data on the property
owner’s ﬁnances, detailed description of the properties condition, and vacancy
status—data that is all unavailable at this time. Without such data, we can only
speculate about the speciﬁc mechanism connecting a foreclosed property to a
neighboring sale.
These results could be limited to housing markets that are relatively stable: St.
Louis County experienced a relatively small housing boom and bust. The relative
stability could allow for a more efﬁcient market clearing process of foreclosures.
On the other hand, the increased experience market participants have had with
foreclosures may have improved their skill. The market, in St. Louis County or
even nationally, is now dealing with the foreclosure process better, which may

















































  Remaining Regression Results
OLS OLS GMM GMM OLS OLS GMM GMM
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
FEMA 100 0.0928 0.0935 0.0462 0.0466 0.0926 0.0932 0.0466 0.0470
(15.20) (15.31) (8.94) (9.04) (15.32) (15.45) (9.03) (9.12)
Age 0.0121 0.0120 0.0140 0.0139 0.0121 0.0120 0.0140 0.0138
(61.73) (61.55) (105.31) (104.36) (61.36) (61.15) (105.37) (104.20)
Age2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(36.19) (36.03) (79.93) (79.05) (36.10) (35.87) (79.99) (78.85)
Log(Area) 0.1343 0.1339 0.1332 0.1327 0.1317 0.1316 0.1329 0.1326
(71.71) (71.57) (79.08) (78.89) (70.19) (70.41) (79.00) (78.96)
Log(Living) 0.4291 0.4238 0.3058 0.3040 0.4272 0.4203 0.3070 0.3040
(113.60) (112.18) (112.08) (111.02) (113.75) (111.64) (112.48) (110.81)
Log(Stories) 0.0587 0.0562 0.0372 0.0367 0.0557 0.0541 0.0374 0.0368
(13.78) (13.28) (11.73) (11.58) (13.19) (12.87) (11.78) (11.63)
Log(Bedrooms) 0.0493 0.0503 0.0771 0.0776 0.0488 0.0502 0.0768 0.0776
(11.92) (12.20) (27.08) (27.27) (11.86) (12.26) (26.96) (27.25)
Log(Bathrooms) 0.1585 0.1603 0.1209 0.1216 0.1568 0.1585 0.1210 0.1220




















  Remaining Regression Results
OLS OLS GMM GMM OLS OLS GMM GMM
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
HalfBath 0.0693 0.0693 0.0463 0.0464 0.0686 0.0686 0.0463 0.0465
(43.52) (43.75) (36.81) (36.93) (43.36) (43.63) (36.82) (37.02)
AC 0.1029 0.0980 0.0695 0.0684 0.1010 0.0972 0.0695 0.0683
(25.01) (23.86) (29.46) (29.00) (24.79) (23.96) (29.41) (28.90)
Chimney 0.0772 0.0769 0.0589 0.0589 0.0766 0.0765 0.0590 0.0589
(43.58) (43.62) (40.68) (40.67) (43.42) (43.59) (40.71) (40.74)
Pool 0.0963 0.0973 0.0785 0.0787 0.0964 0.0973 0.0786 0.0789
(27.80) (28.09) (31.22) (31.33) (27.81) (28.06) (31.24) (31.41)
Tennis 0.1651 0.1691 0.1442 0.1456 0.1680 0.1725 0.1443 0.1463
(4.22) (4.37) (7.73) (7.82) (4.34) (4.51) (7.73) (7.85)
Log(Metro) 0.0050 0.0138 0.0104 0.0044 0.0064 0.0146 0.0100 0.0024
(2.02) (5.60) (5.00) (2.08) (2.61) (5.97) (4.79) (1.12)
Log(Ramp) 0.0099 0.0085 0.0074 0.0063 0.0078 0.0062 0.0069 0.0055
(8.76) (7.55) (3.16) (2.68) (6.84) (5.53) (2.95) (2.38)
Log(ArtRoad) 0.0049 0.0052 0.0111 0.0113 0.0051 0.0052 0.0110 0.0111

















































  Remaining Regression Results
OLS OLS GMM GMM OLS OLS GMM GMM
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
 0.6582 0.6580 0.6573 0.6522
R2 0.906 0.906 0.939 0.939 0.907 0.908 0.939 0.939
k 115 139 116 140 127 174 128 173
Notes: N  98,828.9. This table reports the remaining results of the hedonic estimations from all models except dummy variables controlling for data of sale
(by quarter), ZIP Code, and house style (as determined by the St. Louis County Assessor) but were included in the estimation. All coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant
at the 5% level except for Log(NrMetro) in Model 8. The GMM procedure was used to control for spatial autocorrelation with autocorrelation parameter 
and 10 nearest-neighbors spatial weight (Kelejian and Prucha, 1999). For OLS, the heteroscedasticity robust z-statistics are in parentheses; GMM estimates
report also asymptotic z-statistics. The following variables were included but not reported: dummy variables controlling for data of sale (by quarter), ZIP
Code, and house style (as determined by the St. Louis County Assessor).478  Rogers and Winter
 Endnotes
1 We do not have the appropriate data to measure vacancies, maintenance, or crime. We
leave this to future study.
2 Alternative weights of 5 and 15 nearest neighbors were also tested using a Lagrangian
Multiplier test (Anselin, 1988) but use of other weights did not change the results in any
signiﬁcant way.
3 See LaCour-Little (2004) for a recent mortgage default literature review.
4 See Dye and McMillen (2007) for a recent implementation of the Heckman procedure
with respect to a housing model.
5 The St. Louis County Assessor’s ofﬁce excludes from arms-length housing sales all
foreclosures, liquidations, transfers, and ‘‘quit-claim’’ deeds. According to the County
Assessor’s ofﬁces, the foreclosure category includes all foreclosures and liquidations but
not estate sales and other sales with unusual amounts of personal property.
6 See Long and Ervin (2000) for details.
7 Immergluck and Smith (2006a) differentiate foreclosures by type of loan (conventional
single-family, government-backed, and commercial/multi-family). They found the
marginal impact of foreclosures to differ depending on the type of mortgage defaulted
on. Commercial/multi-family produced the greatest marginal impact followed by
conventional, while government-backed foreclosures had no signiﬁcant impact. We do
not have data on the type of loan homeowners possess, and so consequently cannot verify
this aspect of their ﬁndings.
8 We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point.
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